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Ar t i c l es
Pan Hannian (1906-1977) became amilitant Commu-
nist in 1925, with re-
markable talents as an or-
ganiser, diplomat, and
communicator. He was
put in charge of some
highly specific missions
by the Party: organising
the League of Left-Wing
Writers, negotiating with
warlords or the National-
ist regime, directing intel-
ligence operations or ral-
lying democratic personalities to the new Communist
regime. He held the prestigious post of deputy mayor of
Shanghai from May 1949 until April 1955, when sud-
denly he became caught up in a top-level power struggle
in the Communist regime in what became known as the
“Gao Gang-Rao Shushi” affair. (2) Pan and his boss, the
Shanghai Party secretary Rao Shushi, along with Yang
Fan, the chief of Shanghai police from 1949 to 1951,
were accused of having shielded a large number of the
former regime’s secret agents and of having caused seri-
ous damage to the people’s interests. Pan’s reputation
was further sullied by the revelation of a clandestine
meeting in 1943, while he was a Communist Party secret
agent, with Wang Jingwei, who headed a puppet regime
of the Japanese at that time. Charged with treachery
(neijian), counter-revolutionary acts (fangeming) and col-
laborating with the Kuomintang (KMT – tewu), he spent
the rest of his life, from 1955 until 1977, between prison
and laogai camps (the Chinese gulag). His wife, Dong
Hui (1918-1979), also a former Communist secret agent,
suffered the same fate and died, like him, in a camp in
Hunan. In 1982, the Party absolved Pan of all charges,
rehabilitating him and his wife posthumously. Their re-
mains were reburied in Beijing’s Babaoshan Cemetery,
which is reserved for revolutionary heroes and high-rank-
ing Communist cadres.
The Pan Hannian Affair and
Power Struggles at the Top 
of the CCP (1953-1955)
XIAOHONG XIAO-PLANES
1. This text benefited from the observations of Marie-Claire Bergère, Yves Chevrier, Jean-Luc
Domenach, Alain Roux, and two anonymous reviewers for China Perspectives. Profuse
thanks to all of them, especially J-L. Domenach, who showed great interest in my work on
the Pan Hannian affair. Our discussion on the issue helped me considerably in sharpening
my analyses. I also thank the students who attended the seminar offered by Y. Chevrier and
me in 2009-2010 at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences), on “First
years of the Maoist regime: Framework of political and social history of the 1950s.” 
2. Gao Gang (1905-1954) and Rao Shushi (1903-1975) were high-ranking Party leaders.
Between 1949 and 1952, they were the leaders in charge respectively of Northeast
(Manchuria) and East China. Moved to Beijing in 1953 during a reshuffle of central po-
litical-administrative organs, they made a scramble for power, attacking some leading
lights in the regime. They failed and were accused of having formed an “anti-Party al-
liance” and a “counter-revolutionary clique.” Gao committed suicide on 17 August 1954;
Rao was arrested on 1 April 1955 and died in prison during the Cultural Revolution. The
best work on the Gao-Rao Affair is by Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics at Mao’s Court: Gao
Gang and party factionalism in the early 1950s, Armonk (NY) and London, M.E. Sharpe,
1990. For a perspective different from that of Teiwes and focusing on the structural and
faction-based factors in the Gao-Rao affair, see Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese
Communist Politics, Chapter 4, “The transition of the Yan’an Round Table,” Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 173-210. 
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ABSTRACT: Pan Hannian (1906-1977), Communist activist from 1925, former senior head of the CCP secret service
and deputy mayor of Shanghai after the PRC’s founding, was arrested in 1955 for treachery and counter-revolutionary
crimes. He was condemned, with his wife Dong Hui, to imprisonment and to laogai camps for the rest of his life. His
posthumous rehabilitation in 1982 transformed him into a legendary national hero. Illustrative of the political
struggles in 1953-1955, the Pan Hannian affair seems to reveal the methods Mao Zedong used from time to time in
managing the Party internally so as to maintain his dominant position in the leadership. (1)
Pan Hannian 
in early 1950
The Pan Hannian Affair and Power Struggles at the Top of the CCP (1953-1955) 
Pan was quickly raised to legendary hero status. The charges
against him (and Yang Fan) are now regarded as having
been part of the first unjust political trial (yuan’an) of the
People’s Republic. Over the past two decades, articles and
commemorative publications have proliferated, as have fic-
tionalised biographies. (3) China Central Television marked
Pan’s birth centenary with a 30-episode serial focusing on
his life and exploits.
Independent of the public’s interest in it, the eulogising of
Pan met the needs of a post-Maoist restoration of normality
within the Party. Archives relating to the Pan case have
never been opened to outside researchers, although a few of-
ficial researchers have had some restricted access, as for in-
stance Yin Qi, author of a richly documented biography. (4)
Other writers were able to get their hands on pre-1949 Party
archives, which are often less sensitive, (5) and draw upon the
now republished writings of Pan. (6) Sources relating to the
Gao-Rao affair – Mao’s speeches,  senior leaders’ state-
ments, as well as accounts by former colleagues of Gao
Gang and Rao Shushi (7) – have helped penetrate the secrets
surrounding the charges laid against Pan by revealing the po-
litical nature of the inquisitorial trials of the period and by
clarifying Mao’s crucial role in organising them.
Many biographers and observers believe the suit against Pan
stemmed from leftist ideology and Mao’s arbitrary authori-
tarianism. But this interpretation fails to explain why the
Gao-Rao affair suddenly flared in intensity towards late
March 1955, given that the Politburo had until then been re-
strained in punishing Rao Shushi. (8) His sudden arrest on 1
April 1955 marked a turn for the worse in his case: his mis-
takes vis-à-vis the Party had become a counter-revolutionary
crime. Just two days later, Pan’s indictment was decided
with no preliminary investigation whatsoever. One might
well wonder whether the action against the two men had
other political motivations and whether Pan’s arrest was re-
ally meant above all to point to the existence of a so-called
counter-revolutionary clique within the Party. It will not be
possible to know with certainty so long as researchers remain
locked out of the Party archives. Based on a number of cur-
rently available sources, this article seeks to shed some light
on Pan – the man, his place in history, and his mysterious
trial. A young communist  scholar  inShanghai
Pan Hannian was born on 12 January 1906 in a village in
Yixing County to the west of Taihu Lake in the Yangzi River
delta. It was one of the richest regions in imperial China,
noted not only for the abundance of its farm produce and
pottery but also for the number of its renowned literary fig-
ures, members of the select band of imperial examination
graduates. For generations, the Pan family had been made
up of scholar-peasants focusing on teaching, tending to the
family lands, and raising silkworms. The young Pan Han-
nian attended new schools in his village and then in the city
but was unable to complete his secondary studies due to his
family’s declining finances. Growing up at the time of the
New Culture movement and the vernacular language move-
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3. Following are some of the best biographies on Pan: Tang Yu (ed.), Lingluo chengni xiang
ru gu – yinian Pan Hannian, Dong Hui (Lingering fragrance from petals turned to dust –
Homage to Pan Hannian and Dong Hui), Beijing, Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian,
1984; Huiyi Pan Hannian (Remembering Pan Hannian), Nanjing, Jiangsu renmin chuban-
she, 1985; Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei dangshi yanjiushi (ed.), Pan Hannian zai Shang-
hai (Pan Hannian in Shanghai), Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1995; Xia Yan, Lan xun ji-
umeng lu (In quest of ancient dreams), Beijing, Shenghuo duchu xinzhi sanlian shudian,
1985; (reissued with additions, 2000). The last biography of Pan Hannian, published in
2006, was a reissue of the version published ten years earlier: Zhang Yun, Pan Hannian
zhuan (Biography of Pan Hannian), Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006.
4. Yin Qi, Pan Hannian de qingbao shengya (Pan Hannian’s intelligence career), Beijing,
Renmin chubanshe, 1996. Yin says in a postscript in his book that he was able to con-
sult a number of closed archives and documents with the help of senior public security
ministry (Gonganbu) officials. Few copies were printed of the book’s first version, which
appeared in 1991, and it circulated within limited politico-legal (zhengfa xitong) circles.
Updated and completed with the help of new material, the 1996 version won the right
to unrestricted circulation. Yin Qi also helped edit the CCTV film on Pan.
5. The periodical Dang de wenxian (Party Documents), 1993, no. 3, has published the
telegrammes that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai sent to Pan regarding CCP-KMT talks be-
tween August 1936 and July 1937. They were reproduced in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai
(Pan Hannian in Shanghai), pp. 209-215. See also Pan’s reports to Mao and other cen-
tral leaders (12 November 1936); and the CCP delegation to Comintern (21 November
1936), ibid, pp. 216-229.
6. Pan Hannian shiwen xuan (Selected poetry and prose of Pan Hannian), Shanghai renmin
chubanshe, 1995.
7. For Mao’s views, see “Zai Zhongguo gongchandang quanguo daibiao huiyi shang de
jianghua” (Speeches at the CCP national conference), 21 and 31 March 1955; “Zai qijie
liuzhong quanhui kuoda huiyi shang de zongjie” (Report to the enlarged meeting of the
sixth plenum of the seventh Party congress), October 1955. For accounts of the former
colleagues of Gao and Rao: Jing Yuchuan, “Rao Shushi yu Rao-Pan-Yang fangeming an”
(Rao Shushi and the counter-revolution trial), in Dangshi wenyuan (Literature on party
building), no. 1, 2008, pp. 37-41. There are numerous accounts of cadres and victims of
the Pan-Yang affair, including: Yang Fan, Yang Fan zishu (Yang Fan’s writings), Beijing,
Qunzhong chubanshe, 1989; Luo Qingchang, “Pan Hannian yuan’an de lishi jiaoxun” (A
historic lesson from Pan Hannian’s unjust trial), in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai, op. cit., pp.
363-368; Yang Shangkun, “Huiyi Gao-Rao shijian” (Memories of the Gao-Rao affair), in
Dang de wenxian (Party Documents), 2001, no. 1, pp. 14-22; no. 2, pp. 16-23, 85; Yang
Shangkun, Yang Shangkun riji (Yang Shangkun’s Diaries), Bejing, Zhongyang wenxian
chubanshe, vol. 1, 2001 (1955: 19-21 March and 1-4 April), pp. 177-183. The publica-
tion of the diaries of Yang Shangkun, who directed the CCP Central Committee general
office (Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting) from 1949 to 1965, contributed greatly to
the understanding of Mao’s role in these political trials. 
8. Yang Shangkun riji, vol. 1, Saturday 19 March 1955, pp. 177-178, op. cit.; Jing Yuchuan,
“Rao Shushi yu Rao-Pan-Yang fangeming an,” op. cit.; Zhao Jialiang and Zhang Xiaoji,
Banjie mubei xia de wangshi — Gao Gang zai Beijing, (Gao Gang in Beijing – A past
buried under a broken tombstone), Hong Kong, Dafeng chubanshe, 2008. Colleagues or
those who had been close to Gao and Rao have for many years now been urging the
Party leadership to reopen their case. After all, the “counter-revolution” charge against
Rao was essentially based on the “crimes” of Pan Hannian and Yang Fan in running
Shanghai’s public security, and both were rehabilitated in the early 1980s.
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ment (baihua yundong), (9) he devoured the rich literary
crop that abounded in the early 1920s. He devoted him-
self to literary creation, sending poems as well as short es-
says discussing problems in education and other social
phenomena to Shanghai publications. 
In 1925, aged 19, Pan went to work in Shanghai. With
help from a fellow Yixing resident, he found a job as a
proof-reader and then editorial assistant with China Pub-
lishing House (Zhonghua shuju), which together with
Shangwu (Shanghai Commercial Press) controlled the
country’s textbook market. The two publishers also put out
several magazines aimed at educated urban readers and
had an editorial stable made up of writers, journalists, in-
tellectuals, and academics. Pan excelled at editing work,
basking in the company of writers and sharing his passions
with a group of young literature enthusiasts who like him
were admirers of the Chuangzaoshe or Creation Society
led by Guo Moruo, Yue Dafu, and Cheng Fangwu. Young
Pan and his friends violently attacked all the societal evils:
political corruption, warlords’ arrogance, big power impe-
rialism, and the elites’ ambivalent cynicism. Pan liked to
provoke, coming up with eccentric proposals hardly suited
to the old order. Many of his friends from that time could
hardly have imagined that this “little Pan, so laid back and
free as a bird, could one day become a major secret agent
for the Party.” (10)
The Shanghai of the mid-1920s bustled with diverse ide-
ological currents, all sorts of political parties cohabiting
and competing. The young Pan joined the Nationalists
(Kuomintang, KMT) and then the Communists, allies in
a Comintern-backed “united front.” After throwing him-
self into all sorts of propaganda work, he went to the rev-
olutionary bastions of Wuhan and Nanchang during the
winter of 1926-1927 to help bring out a small publication
aimed at raising soldiers’ political consciousness. But the
united front collapsed in July 1927. Pan left the National-
ist army and resumed his literary activities in Shanghai’s
concessions, alongside his friends and innumerable politi-
cal refugees, militant leftists, writers, or intellectuals seek-
ing to shelter from the White Terror. (11) The young ac-
tivists, especially former students in Japan belonging to
the literary groups Chuangzaoshe and Taiyangshe (Sun
Society), continued to drum up revolutionary zeal and to
fulminate against the treachery and cowardice of their for-
mer allies. In 1928 and 1929, they initiated a debate on
the future of proletarian revolutionary literature, hitting
out at the “bourgeois sentimentalism and conservatism” of
literary forebears such as Lu Xun, Yue Dafu, and Mao
Dun. The Communist Party was then resurfacing gradu-
ally and rebuilding its destroyed networks. In mid-1929, it
sought to intervene in the fratricidal quarrels in writers’
circles. Pan was called upon to lead a Party cultural work
committee. His brief was to put an end to polemics and
arrange for reconciliation between Lu Xun and other writ-
ers. The success of this mission led to the formation in
Shanghai on 1 March 1930 of a league of Chinese leftist
writers, bringing together Lu Xun and his former adver-
saries. Pan played a major role in this owing to his talents
as an orator and his eclectic spirit.
The writers’ league led to a series of literary and artistic
groupings (social sciences, film, theatre, music, and so
on), which undeniably contributed to Shanghai’s cultural
effervescence in the 1930s. Their success was facilitated
by the emergence of new urban public spaces thanks to
the aggravation of the Japanese threat since 1931-1932.
Party cultural work authorities such as Pan Hannian, Feng
Xuefeng, and Xia Yan, seized the initiative in the domain
of artistic creation and social contact. (12) Pan was espe-
cially active in the matter of communication and building
links. “He liked visiting people with differing opinions,
frequenting the most varied social milieu, so as to gather
information he needed and gauge the real situation in so-
ciety then.” (13) He seemed more and more at ease in the
changing and open environment of the big city. He spoke
the Shanghai dialect, often wore Western-style clothing,
and sported gold-rimmed spectacles. He was ever smiling,
amiable, and loquacious in the company of his friends.
Perhaps the only dark cloud was his unhappy family life,
thanks to a marriage his parents had arranged. But Pan
would cherish a life-long affinity with this world of the
1920-1930 Shanghai circles he frequented. Some of those
friends stayed loyal to him, despite his indictment as a trai-
tor.
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9. The New Culture movement erupted in urban areas between 1915 and 1925, led by pro-
gressive intellectuals and young students critical of the traditional social order and the
conservative Confucian spirit. They advocated democracy and science and they circu-
lated simplified literature for mass consumption, replacing traditional written language
with a popular spoken one. The movement influenced an entire generation of Chinese
youth.
10. Lou Shiyi, “Sandeli kaishi de youyi” (Friendship born in Sandeli), in Huiyi Pan Hannian,
op. cit., p. 54.
11. The foreign jurisdictions’ tolerance of political refugees was not to last. In the 1930s, the
authorities in Shanghai’s concessions handed over arrested Communists or political
suspects to the Nanjing authorities. On this collaboration, see Frederic Wakeman Jr.,
Policing Shanghai 1927-1937, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995.
12. See Xia Yan, Lan xun jiumeng lu, op. cit., chapters 4 and 5.
13. Shen Songquan, “Si ru chunjiang shui, kangkai song zhonghun — huiyi Pan Hannian
tongzhi de jijianshi” (A thought that flowed like a river in Spring – some memories of
comrade Pan Hannian), in Huiyi Pan Hannian, op. cit., pp. 73-81 at p. 77.
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A versati le  emissary fl itt ingamong Ruij in,  Moscow,  andShaanbei
Pan disappeared from the literary scene around May 1931,
when he was moved to the Party’s Special Work Committee
(Teke). It was formed in November 1927 by Zhou Enlai, at
that time the leading official in charge of the Communists’
military action. Its mission was to combat the Nationalist
government’s dismantling of operations and to protect the
Shanghai-based central organs of the Party. (14) After the be-
trayal of the former Teke chief in January 1931, Pan was
called upon to help with its reorganisation alongside Com-
munist leading lights such as Chen Yun and Kang Sheng.
He ran the intelligence service and was in charge of keeping
in touch with those who had infiltrated the Nanjing regime’s
intelligence service, rebuilding dismantled networks and
sometimes warning Party cadres facing danger. (15) At that
time, his writer friends might well have run into him in the
street, looking like a worker or a professional. Knowing the
discipline of clandestine work, they would have avoided
speaking.
But the government’s relentless repression and the CCP
leadership’s leftist line made it impossible to maintain the
central organisms in Shanghai. Top leaders left. Some took
refuge in Moscow and others in the Red base of Ruijin, in
Jiangxi province. (16) In mid-1933, Pan went to Ruijin and
found other Politburo members such as Zhang Wentian, Bo
Gu, and Chen Yu, with whom he shared lodgings. He took
charge of propaganda work and mass mobilisation. In Octo-
ber that year, the Party sent him to Fujian, east of Ruijin, to
negotiate a truce with the chiefs of the Nationalists’ 19th
Route Army, who wished to cease hostilities with the Com-
munists. Pan then spent some months in the provincial cap-
ital Fuzhou as CCP representative to a dissident government
formed by military chiefs and opponents of Chiang Kai-
shek. (17) A little after his return to Ruijin, the Party leader-
ship decided in October 1934 to abandon the base under
military pressure from the Nationalist forces and to head to-
ward the southwest. Zhou Enlai, who was in charge of the
Communist forces, asked Pan again to negotiate with
Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang a neutrality pact that would
let the Red Army gain passage into the north of the
province. Mission accomplished, Pan took part for some
months in the Long March. He got to know central leaders,
including Mao Zedong, who had been eased out of his mil-
itary and civil functions by the leaders who had returned
from Moscow and who had the backing of Pavel Mif, the
Comintern representative. Mao seemed to like listening to
Pan, 13 years his junior. Several accounts have testified to
Pan’s gift for elocution: It was often left to him to enliven
conversations with “vivid and incisive” speech, while keep-
ing his secret work under wraps. (18)
A little after Mao regained his post on the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee in January 1935, Pan was given a new task:
to restore links cut with the Comintern. The Chinese dele-
gation to Comintern put him in charge of meeting in
Moscow, in early 1936, the representative of Chiang Kai-
shek, who had received Stalin’s pledge of assistance in the
Anti-Japanese War. Pan maintained contact in Hong Kong
with the Kuomintang, but also met Nanjing dissidents, civil-
ians, or military personalities estranged from the Nationalist
regime. He then renewed contacts with the clandestine
Communist Party in Shanghai and with the central team in-
stalled at Bao’an and Shaanbei in China’s Northwest. He
went there in August 1936 to report to the Politburo the di-
rectives from Comintern, the position of the Chinese dele-
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14. The full name of Teke was “Special Work Committee of the CCP Central Military Commis-
sion.” It had four services under it: 1) the administration, which oversaw the finances, lo-
gistics, and the daily life of the Party’s top leaders; 2) the “Red Squads” (Hongdui) – also
called “the dog-hunters’ brigade” – whose task was to summarily execute Communist
traitors; 3) the intelligence service, which gathered information and supervised the infil-
tration of agents into the Nationalists’ police and special services; 4) the communication
service, which ensured radio contacts among the four services, between Shanghai and
rural-based Communist guerrillas, and between the CCP and the Comintern. On the ac-
tivities of Teke, see: Faligot Roger and Rémi Kauffer, Kang Sheng et les services secrets
chinois (1927-1987), Paris, Robert Laffont, 1987; Byron John and Robert Pack, The Claws
of the Dragon: Kang Sheng the Evil Genius Behind Mao and His Legacy of Terror in Peo-
ple’s China, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992; Frederic Wakeman Jr., Policing Shang-
hai 1927-1937, op. cit., pp. 132-162; Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service,
Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2003, pp. 132-156.
15. On Pan’s work in the special services between 1931 and 1933, see Jin Chongji (ed.),
Chen Yun zhuan (Chen Yun’s biography), Beijing, Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005,
vol. 1, pp. 103-114; Chen Xiuliang, Pan Hannian feifan de yisheng (The uncommon life
of Pan Hannian), Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989, pp. 16-22. Chen Yun had
been one of the leaders in charge of Teke at that time, and Chen Xiuliang was a clan-
destine Party activist in Shanghai.
16. Ruijin County, in the south of Jiangxi Province close to Fujian, hosted the biggest Com-
munist bases in the 1930s, including the soviets’ central government and the guerrilla
zones’ Politburo. The CCP central organs were moved there from Shanghai in 1933.
17. The 19th Route Army was of Guangdong origin. It excelled in Sun Yat-sen’s military suc-
cesses in the 1920s and took the initiative to resist Japanese forces in the Shanghai-
Wusong battle of early 1932. In opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian policies,
the 19th Route Army leaders and civilian dissidents set up a “people’s revolutionary gov-
ernment” in Fujian in November 1933, but the Nanjing government’s attacks put an end
to this experiment two months later.
18. Xu Dixin, “Zhanshi ‘fuben’ ershiqi zai — jinian Pan Hannian tongzhi” (27 years of injus-
tice – in memory of comrade Pan Hannian), in Huiyi Pan Hannian, op. cit., pp. 43-52, at
p. 44. There are many accounts regarding Pan’s talent as an orator. On his activities and
the company he kept at Ruijin, see Liu Ying, “Dui Pan Hannian tongzhi de pianduan
huiyi” (Some memories of Comrade Pan Hannian), in Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei 
dangshi yanjiushi (ed.), Pan Hannian zai Shanghai, op. cit., pp. 508-512; Liu Ying, Wo yu
Zhang Wentian mingyun yu gong de licheng (My journeys with Zhang Wentian), Beijing,
Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1997, pp. 44-45; 61-62; 99-100; Zhang Yun, Pan 
Hannian zhuan, op. cit., pp. 97-116. Li Yimang, “Jinian Pan Hannian tongzhi” (In hom-
age to Comrade Pan Hannian), in Tang Yu (ed.), Lingluo chengni xiang ru gu — yinian
Pan Hannian, Donghui, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
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gation in Moscow, and the outcome of his meetings with
Nationalist delegates. He returned to Shanghai a little af-
terwards, this time mandated by the CCP central leader-
ship with meeting different factions of the Kuomintang and
preparing the necessary ground for forging a new alliance
between the two parties. In March 1937, he accompanied
Zhou Enlai to meet Generalissimo Chiang in Hangzhou:
a second KMT-CCP front was formalised in July 1937,
just as the Sino-Japanese war broke out. The alliance
helped the CCP emerge into the open and recover its
place at the heart of the national scene. (19)Deployment o f  the  UnitedFront during  the  Sino-JapaneseWar
The second united front gave the CCP much elbow room,
which, among other things, helped it open representative
units in major cities in the name of “Office of the Eighth
Route Army” (as the Red Army was now called). From
July 1937 until early 1938, Pan took part successively in
heading the “Eighth Route Army Office” in Shanghai,
then in Hong Kong. In Shanghai, his mission was to re-
ceive and reassign released Communist prisoners, promote
social ties under the garb of patriotism in the city, and su-
pervise publication of a daily called Jiuwang ribao (Na-
tional Salvation), which helped the Party reach out to sev-
eral democratic personages, (20) writers, journalists, and in-
tellectuals. Between August and November 1937, Pan him-
self wrote some 20 articles in the daily advancing Commu-
nist positions in the Anti-Japanese resistance and in the
quest for potential alliances. After Japan overran Shanghai,
the daily was published from Guangzhou and then Guilin
in Guangxi. On Zhou Enlai’s orders, Pan personally
arranged the evacuation of the democratic personages and
hundreds of sympathetic intellectuals to Hong Kong,
Guangzhou, Guilin, and Chongqing. He also organised
groups of artists and writers and divided them among mili-
tary units. (21)
In late December 1937, Pan left the “isolated island” made
up of international settlements in Shanghai for Hong
Kong. In early 1938, he spent some time in Wuhan, the
provisional capital hosting the Yangzi office
(Changjiangju) representing the CCP’s central leadership.
It was under the charge of Wang Ming, who had just re-
turned from Moscow, as well as Zhou Enlai and other top
figures. Zhou sought to exploit the political opening in
order to implant communist structures in China’s interior as
well as in Southeast Asia. In March, Pan returned to Hong
Kong, where he and Liao Chengzhi manned the Eighth
Route Army office in charge of regrouping Communist
guerrillas in southern China. (22) Using their contacts among
the overseas Chinese and KMT Leftists as well as other
social networks, Pan and Liao sought to boost the CCP’s
profile and that of its armed forces, raise funds and re-
sources, and gather all sorts of intelligence. 
From 29 September to 6 November 1938, Pan took part
in the 6th plenum in Yan’an of the Sixth Party Congress,
which was meant to settle the differences between Mao’s
central team in Shaanbei and the Wang Ming-led represen-
tation in Wuhan. With unequivocal backing from Moscow,
Mao’s leadership prevailed, and Yan’an restored its repre-
sentation structures in non-Communist zones. The old se-
curity and intelligence services were also overhauled and
regrouped under a department of social affairs (Shehuibu)
led by Kang Sheng, Li Kenong, and Pan Hannian. Pan fo-
cused mostly on training action units and secret agents,
some of whom later followed him to Hong Kong and
Shanghai. (23) There he met a student, Dong Hui, 12 years
his junior and from a family of Hong Kong bankers. She
went on to join his intelligence unit and later became his
second wife.
Pan-Liao in 1938 at Hong Kong, Pan Hannian is the first
from the left on the second line. Liao is the first (with a
child) from the right on the first line.
Ar t i c l es
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19. Twenty years later, the contacts and talks between Pan and the KMT’s Central Club fac-
tion, especially with Chen Lifu and Zhang Chong, would be considered proof of his
treachery. Pan was accused, among other things, of having been an agent of the Cen-
tral Club faction, although Mao knew perfectly well the actual facts: Yin Qi, Pan Hannian
de qingbao shengya, op. cit., pp. 241-242.
20. “Democratic Personages” (minzhu renshi) was a label the CCP put on leading dissidents
in the Nationalist regime, leading Communist sympathisers or neutral persons, or those
enjoying certain public renown. 
21. On the retreat from Shanghai in 1937 and evacuation of writers and intellectuals in 1938
to Guangzhou and in 1940 to Hong Kong after the Japanese invasion, see Xia Yan’s ex-
cellent account, Lan xun jiumeng lu, op. cit., pp. 204-307. 
22. Liao, of Guangdong origin, was the only son of Liao Zhongkai, once the right-hand man
of Sun Yat-sen and leader of the KMT’s right wing, assassinated in 1925. Liao
Zhongkai’s wife, He Xiangning, was also a prominent personality. She and Sun’s widow,
Song Qingling, represented the KMT left wing, which was close to the CCP. Due to his-
torical reasons and geography, many KMT leaders had vast networks of sympathisers
among overseas Chinese and among some foreign institutions. 
23. Liu Renshou, “Yi Pan Hannian tongzhi ji ta suo lingdao de Shanghai danwei de ruogan
qingkuang” (Memories of Pan Hannian and action units under his charge in Shanghai),
in Huiyi Pan Hannian, op. cit., pp. 160-172.
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Espionage and counter-espionage
Despite his extraordinary reputation, Pan was more a versa-
tile secret agent of the CCP than a classic spy. It was the
Japanese invasion that led to a full scale redrawing of
China’s political scene and opened up a new phase in Pan’s
career.
In April 1939, Pan returned to Hong Kong to obtain treat-
ment for an eye problem. Yan’an asked him to stay there and
supervise the organisation of an intelligence service in south-
ern China. Pan restructured the existing teams by adding re-
cently recruited agents sent by Yan’an. He established con-
tact with agents from different networks installed in Hong
Kong. Among them was the representation office of Gen-
eral Li Du, leader of the Manchurian resistance, (24) the So-
viet intelligence office for the Far East, the international re-
search institute – a front for Juntong (the reporting commit-
tee of the Nationalist army), which was Chiang Kai-shek’s
most powerful secret service – and the private cabinet of
prime minister Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kong). From Septem-
ber 1939, Pan strengthened his network (known as Pan xi-
tong) from Hong Kong to Shanghai. He placed a Commu-
nist-Nationalist double agent from Juntong, Yuan Shu, in the
“Iwai Intelligence Agency,” which was a branch of the
Japanese foreign ministry’s intelligence system in China,
headed by Eiichi Iwai, Japan’s vice-consul general in Shang-
hai. Pan met him in November and entered into an agree-
ment according to which Iwai subsidised a politically neutral
periodical known as Ershi shiji (Twentieth century) that Pan
was putting out from Hong Kong. In exchange Pan’s group
provided Iwai’s intelligence agency once a fortnight with in-
telligence gathered and selected by the Hong Kong CCP. It
was mostly strategic information on politics in the interior of
China, and governmental relations with the Soviet Union,
the United States, Britain, and Germany. (25) Pan frequently
travelled between Hong Kong and Shanghai, meeting Iwai
several times. In March 1940, Iwai introduced him to the
Wang Jingwei government’s military supremo, Major Gen-
eral Sadaaki Kagesa, and other Japanese intelligence offi-
cials. Pan used money given by Iwai to finance the Commu-
nists’ secret service activities. From 1939 to 1941, he ran
quite a network linking Hong Kong and Shanghai. His
Shanghai unit had 30 to 40 agents and possessed two ra-
dios, which helped send important intelligence to Yan’an.
During the fall of Hong Kong, in December 1941, he ob-
tained Iwai’s help to evacuate his team, some to the interior
of China and others to Shanghai. He went about Shanghai
carrying a residency card issued by the Japanese consulate
and stayed in a luxury hotel room reserved under Iwai’s
name.
From 1939, Pan was also in touch with Li Shiqun, chief of
the collaborationist regime’s formidable secret police, (26)
whose Shanghai headquarters was often referred to by its ad-
dress, “76 Jessfield Road.” (27) Li had been a secret CCP
agent, and had then worked for the KMT Central Club fac-
tion’s intelligence service and for the Japanese in 1938. He
later rose rapidly in the puppet regime of Wang Jingwei, and
to keep an exit option open, he secretly offered his services
to the CCP as well. On Yan’an’s orders, Pan placed a spy in
his entourage right from 1939. The two men were in direct
contact from 1942, after Li Shiqun was made governor of
Jiangsu and given charge of rural pacification. He provided
Pan with useful information on the rural clean-up campaign
(qingxiang) covering the headquarters of the new CCP
Fourth Army in the north of Jiangsu. Li introduced Pan to
“76 Jessfield Road” and put him in touch with Zhou Fohai,
the other service chief who maintained links with the Nation-
alists’ Juntong. Li Shiqun designated his assistant Hu Junhe,
another former Communist agent, to serve as go-between for
contacts with Pan. In November 1942, these collaborators
with the Japanese extended protection to Pan and other clan-
destine CCP leaders during their retreat from Shanghai to
the Communist base of Huainan (in the south of Anhui).
Many secret channels linked the two places. All these activi-
ties were approved by the central leadership in Yan’an and re-
ported in detail to the department of social affairs.
Pan in 1938 in Yan’an.
He is the second from the right (with glasses).
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24. Manchuria was under Japanese occupation from 1931 to1932. Diverse political and
military organised resistance there took care of Manchuria’s representation within China
or abroad.
25. Yin Qi, Pan Hannian de qingbao shengya, op. cit., pp. 107-115; Zhang Yun, Pan Hannian
zhuan, op. cit., pp. 199-201; Joseph Yick, “Communist-Puppet collaboration in Japan-
ese-Occupied China: Pan Hannian and Li Shiqun, 1939-43,” in Intelligence and National
Security, vol. 16, no. 4, December 2001, (pp. 61-88), at pp. 66-69. (I thank Jean-Luc
Domenach for getting me this article.)
26. The Japanese occupiers installed power centres in different Chinese regions run by col-
laborators. In Shanghai, the first puppet municipal authority dates back to 1937. From
January 1940, it was answerable to the Nanjing government headed by Wang Jingwei.
The ex-Nationalist leader had defected to the Japanese side in December 1938. 
27. On Li Shiqun and the secret police of “76 Jessfield Road,” see Joseph Yick, “Commu-
nist-Puppet collaboration in Japanese-Occupied China: Pan Hannian and Li Shiqun,
1939-43,” op. cit.; Frederic Wakeman Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism
and Urban Crime, 1937-1941, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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In April 1943, however, Li Shiqun and his assistant
arranged an unexpected meeting in Nanjing between Pan
and Wang Jingwei, the collaborationist regime’s supremo.
Wang was seeking to drive a wedge between the already
feuding CCP and KMT by conveying to Pan his wish to
collaborate with the Communists in calling a national dem-
ocratic parliament. The meeting remained inconclusive, but
on his return to the Huainan base, Pan apparently omitted
any mention of it to the regional leaders, political commis-
sar Rao Shushi and Fourth Army commander-in-chief
Chen Yi. 
In Huainan, Pan became a target in a campaign to rectify
the Party’s work style (zhengfeng), which Rao Shushi was
trying to use in a drive to settle scores with his rival Chen
Yi. Rumours multiplied around Pan regarding his “liberal”
conduct (ziyou zhuyi), “irresponsible talk” (xiao guangbo),
and even “dubious” relations with Li Shiqun and other
renegade agents. (28) In September 1943, the Japanese as-
sassinated Li. When Pan arrived in Yan’an in early 1945,
Mao praised his success in intelligence work and expressed
the Party’s confidence in him. (29) Pan seems to have failed
to use the opportunity to mention his meeting with Wang
Jingwei and explain the circumstances in which it took
place. (30) It was hardly surprising as Pan, known to be cau-
tious and used to work under perilous conditions, failed to
cover his back.At the  peak  of  hi s  career
Soon after Japan’s surrender in April 1946, Pan returned to
Shanghai, and later to Hong Kong, to direct united front
work and the intelligence service. As a Cantonese speaker,
he felt at home there. He excelled in tapping all manner of
contacts to gather information, run a pro-Communist press,
and protect the CCP’s potential allies. From 1947, he was
mainly concerned with meeting, in the free Hong Kong sur-
roundings, all sorts of people – democratic or politically neu-
tral – who were fleeing KMT regime reprisals. He helped
them settle in, set up representative organs, and enabled
them to publish. When needed, he helped reunite families
or overcome financial difficulties. In the spring of 1948, the
CCP appealed to other groups to take part in a consultative
conference in order to form a coalition government. For one
whole year, Pan was given charge of supervising the move-
ment between Hong Kong and the Communist bases in the
north and northeast of those who rallied to the CCP’s side.
Despite the efforts of KMT agents and British authorities’
surveillance, some 350 people reached the Communist
zones. (31) When Communist victory loomed in late 1948,
Pan became the most sought-after person. Everyone flocked
to him for information or to forge relations. Pan also played
a major role in rallying Nationalist institutions to the new
regime.
After the fall of Shanghai in April 1949, Pan was named
deputy mayor, mainly dealing with security and united front
work. He put his energies into restoring social order in a city
gripped by hyperinflation, combating crime, and supervising
a campaign to snuff out opponents linked to the old
regime. (32) On his instructions Shanghai police chief Yang
Fan used a number of double agents or turncoats, infiltrated
the KMT’s clandestine radio stations and appointed Hu
Junhe, former Wang Jingwei regime agent, as the head of an
intelligence committee. Such obviously delicate use of some
double agents led to a few incidents. In late 1951, a public
security ministry investigation concluded that Shanghai po-
lice had made serious mistakes because of insufficient con-
trol over special agents and counter-revolutionary agents.
Yang Fan was dismissed, but his immediate bosses – Pan
Hannian and Rao Shushi – escaped inquiry at that time. (33)
Although relieved of his post as director of the intelligence
The couple Pan Hannian-Dong Hui 
in the 1940s
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28. Yin Qi, Pan Hannian de qingbao shengya, op. cit., p. 168; Zhao Xian, “Pan Hannian he
Dong Hui” (Pan Hannian and Dong Hui) in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai, op. cit., p. 543.
29. Mao sent Rao Shushi a telegramme dismissing any suspicions regarding Pan. See
Zhang Yun, Pan Hannian zhuan, op. cit., p. 241, which contains the telegramme dated
23 February 1945.
30. Pan told friends, while he was on conditional parole from 1963 to 1967, that the fear of
losing face kept him from revealing the full picture. See Tang Yu, “Aisi he yinian”
(Homage and painful memories), in Lingluo chengni xiang ru gu – huiyi Pan Hannian,
op. cit.,p. 63.
31. Xia Yan, “Jinian Pan Hannian tongzhi” (In homage to comrade Pan Hannian), in Huiyi Pan
Hannian, pp. 7-9.
32. On Pan’s public security work in Shanghai, see Frederic Wakeman Jr., “‘Liberation’: The
Shanghai Police, 1942-1952,” in Yves Chevrier, Alain Roux, and Xiaohong Xiao-Planes
(eds.), Citadins et citoyens dans la Chine du XXe siècle (City-dwellers and citizens in
twentieth century China), Paris, Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2010,
pp. 515-535; Yang Fan, “Wuyun sanjin xian zhonghun – daonian Pan Hannian tongzhi”
(An upright soul emerges after dark clouds dissipate – In homage to comrade Pan Hann-
ian), in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai, op. cit., pp. 395-402; Wang Zhengming, “Chenyuan
zhaoxue yingming yongcun” (An injustice overturned, an eternal illustrious name), ibid.
pp. 403-412; “Gaoshan yongcun, dahe changliu – jinian Pan Hannian tongzhi bainian
danchen” (Like eternally standing mountains and eternally flowing rivers – In homage
on the centenary of Pan Hannian’s birth), in Dongfangjian (Oriental Sword ), 2006, no. 7,
pp. 20-22. Thanks to the Pan Hannian-Yan Fan affair, Wang Zhengming, who had worked
under them in Shanghai public security, was jailed twice for a total of 13 years and
seven months.
33. The ministerial inquiry revealed an astounding number of these double agents and turn-
coats – as many as 3,300. Actually it was a figment of imagination stemming from a
joke. On this episode, see Yin Qi, Pan Hannian de qingbao shengya, op. cit., pp. 232-236.
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The Pan Hannian Affair and Power Struggles at the Top of the CCP (1953-1955) 
committee, Hu Junhe continued to work for the Shanghai
police until his sudden arrest in September 1954. (34)
Pan was also concerned with united front work, which con-
sisted of coordinating relations between the CCP and vari-
ous socio-professional circles, especially capitalist entrepre-
neurs who retained a preponderant position in Shanghai so-
ciety. The authorities acutely needed their cooperation in
restoring economic order following the devastation of the
civil war and consequent galloping inflation. Pan sought to
allay the suspicions of the industrialists and financiers as re-
gards the Communist government’s capacity, and helped
them restore production by solving their difficulties over
funding, raw material, transport, or social conflicts. In the lat-
ter half of 1952, Pan oversaw a Beijing-ordered “Five-Anti”
campaign against capitalists, but tried to tone down its more
inhuman aspects in order to spare adverse effects on the
economy. When Beijing decided to nationalise private enter-
prises, he urged those in charge of the economy to spare a
few so as not to scare Chinese capitalists overseas. (35)
As mayor Chen Yi was often tied up with his responsibili-
ties over the eastern military region, Pan had to look after
the day-to-day work of the municipality. He had to receive
and accompany foreign and Chinese dignitaries visiting
Shanghai, preside over public meetings, lead mass mobilisa-
tion campaigns, and initiate municipal construction. He re-
newed contact with his writer friends. “The Pan household,”
recalled friend and colleague Zhao Xian, “was always filled
with people during the weekends and holidays. There were
old acquaintances and friends from literary and artistic cir-
cles, democratic personalities, or those who had worked
under him. People spoke without reserve and Pan got much
information.” (36) He was always well turned out, bore him-
self with elegance, and smoked English cigarettes his wife’s
Hong Kong family supplied. In fact, Zhao Xian was con-
cerned about him during the Three-Anti campaign in early
1952, fearing that Pan could attract public criticism over cor-
rupt thinking and bourgeois lifestyle.The  Gao-Rao af fa ir  and powers truggle at  the  top
The Gao-Rao affair came at a time of structural overhaul of
state and Party institutions and preparations for the Eighth
Party Congress. During the winter of 1952-1953, many re-
gional leaders were called to Beijing in order to strengthen
central organs and prepare for implementation of the first
five-year plan. Among them were Gao Gang, Rao Shushi,
Deng Xiaoping, Deng Zihui, and Xi Zhongxun. Gao went
on to preside over the planning commission; Rao was asked
to head the Party’s organisation department and the govern-
ment’s labour department. After a reshuffle in the govern-
ment, there was to have been one in the CCP Central Com-
mittee and Politburo, the two supreme organs that emerged
from the Seventh Party Congress at Yan’an in 1945. Now
Mao had differences over several issues with some leaders,
especially Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. They shared the
same objectives of socialist transformation of the economy
and Chinese society, but did not always agree on the meth-
ods and timetable for application of their programme, as for
instance the details of farm collectivisation, policies towards
the market, retention of private property, and so on. Gao
Gang often shared Mao’s position, favouring a voluntarist
policy to prioritise the state and collective sectors of the
economy. In early 1953, Mao used the problems encoun-
tered in applying the new fiscal system to severely reprimand
the government for having strayed from Party directives. (37)
This led to Premier Zhou Enlai abandoning the Party coor-
dination structure (dangzu gangshihui) and letting sectoral
components report directly to the Politburo or, in other
words, Mao. Zhou’s real powers were thus significantly re-
duced. He was confined to foreign affairs, whereas Gao
Gang was allowed to oversee eight industry-related min-
istries thanks to his chairmanship of the planning commis-
sion. (38)
In the ensuing months, Mao set about systematically crack-
ing down on “Rightist tendencies” among his Politburo col-
leagues Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and the Rural Works De-
partment head Deng Zihu, who advocated “the need to con-
solidate the new democratic order” (gonggu xinminzhu
zhuyi zhixu), preservation of the “four great freedoms” (sida
ziyou), and “real protection for private property” (quebao
siyou caichan). During a conference on finance and econ-
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34. Wu Jimin, “Hu Junhe yu Pan Hannian yuan’an” (Hu Junhe and the unfair trial of Pan
Hannian), in Dang’an chunqiu (Archival chronicles), 2008, no. 11, pp. 18-23. Notably, the
author interviewed Hu’s wife, Zhao Shangyun, who lived with him from the 1930s on-
wards. Hu (1907-1993) spent 28 years in jail. He was rehabilitated in the 1980s and was
accorded a comfortable retirement as a Shanghai municipal police official.
35. On Pan’s activities during this period in Shanghai, see the articles in the section “Xin
Shanghai de fushizhang” (deputy mayor of new Shanghai) in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai,
op. cit.
36. Zhao Xian, “Pan Hannian yu Dong Hui,” op. cit., pp. 545-546. Pan’s arrest aroused fears
among Shanghai’s capitalists; see Frederic Wakeman Jr., “‘Liberation’: The Shanghai
Police, 1942-1952,” op. cit., pp. 533-534.
37. The new fiscal system unified various existing taxes and established a principle of
equality between public and private firms in tax matters. But Mao saw it as an error of
“Right opportunism” (youqing jihui zhuyi) and “dispersionism” (fensan zhuyi). 
38. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-1976 (Chroni-
cles of Zhou Enlai 1949-1976), Beijing, Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, vol. 1, 1997, pp.
285, 297.
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omy in mid-1953, Mao resumed his attacks on the defects of
the new fiscal system and made Finance Minister Bo Yibo
offer self-criticism. (39) It was in this context that Gao Gang
unleashed a thinly-veiled attack on Liu Shaoqi, stressing his
divergences with Mao with regard to development of agricul-
tural cooperatives, policies towards capitalists, and other
matters. The meeting turned into a venue for settling scores
and lasted many weeks, Mao having let the ambiance be-
come vitiated. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai also had to make
self-criticisms, while Gao became close to Rao Shushi, who
questioned the authority of Liu’s associates in the Party’s
Organisation Department. Gao then went on a tour of the
provinces in order to recruit potential allies among Politburo
members and regional civil and military leaders. He accused
Liu Shaoqi and his North China Bureau (Huabeiju) en-
tourage of having monopolised central power. Gao also
spread rumours that Liu had lost Mao’s confidence. The sit-
uation deteriorated and Mao decided in December to jetti-
son Gao Gang so as to safeguard existing leadership unity.
During the course of 1954, Gao and Rao were accused of
having built an “anti-Party alliance” to seize power. A series
of meetings were held in Beijing, and then in the former ju-
risdictions of the duo – Manchuria and East China – to de-
nounce their past and current mistakes and to sweep out
their adverse influence in the Party and government.Pan as  v ict im of  the  Gao-Raoaffair
Gao committed suicide on 17 August 1954 and Rao be-
came the sole target of the purge. In Rao’s former fief –
eastern China – his critics reopened a case that had been
suppressed for three years, of the use of double agents or
turncoats by the Shanghai police between 1949 and 1951.
At the same time, accusations against Rao Shushi escalated.
In the autumn of 1954, the public security ministry officially
resumed a criminal investigation. Double agent Hu Junhe
and former Shanghai police chief Yang Fan were picked up
and taken to Beijing. Before the Party’s national conference
held from 21 to 31 March 1955, the Politburo had decided
to drop Rao from the Central Committee, and he was then
expelled from the Party. He was arrested on 1 April for
counter-revolutionary crimes in the presence of three senior
leaders: Public Security Minister Luo Ruiqing and the two
top leaders in charge of the eastern region, Chen Yi and Tan
Zhenlin. Two days later, it was the turn of Pan Hannian to
be detained in his Beijing hotel after he revealed that in
1943 he had met Wang Jingwei. (40) Mao was reported to
have been angry on learning of Pan’s confession and de-
clared then and there, “This person can no longer be
trusted.” On 4 April, at the opening of the Fifth Plenum of
the Seventh Party Congress, Mao cited Pan as a prime ex-
ample of an enemy hiding within the Party. Yang Shangkun
noted in his diaries: 
Chairman Mao specifically pointed out, in his speech,
that there was a tendency “more to the right than left”
[ning you wu zuo] inside the Party. Under such influ-
ence, people failed to pay sufficient heed to the dan-
ger of destruction of the Party by enemy infiltrators.
They had thus let down their guard and this had led
to failings. Henceforth, priority should be attached to
rectifying Rightist tendencies, to fighting laxity in the
political struggle and lack of vigilance. It is only when
everyone keeps in mind such problems that we can
fight against Leftist tendencies. What is needed is to
not let a counter-revolutionary off in the struggle
against Right opportunism or to wrong a revolutionary
while combating Left adventurism. Take Pan’s exam-
ple. (41) He has been in the Party over a long period
and most of us know him. It’s as if we were sleeping
blindly beside a tiger. But soon as we discover it is a
tiger, we should open our eyes wide, draw a clear line
in relations with him and help the Party to unmask
him. Above all, we should never abandon the princi-
ples of a Communist for having shared a bed with the
tiger. (42)
Charges of counter-revolutionary crime against Pan were
made public on 16 July 1955. Pan had dealt with several
senior Party leaders during his career, enjoyed great popu-
larity among CCP cadres and writers, artists, and capitalists
of Shanghai as well as among prominent non-Communists in
China and abroad. A lot of them sought effective proof of
his treachery, especially those who had been part of his clan-
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39. On the conference proceedings, see Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu
(Reflections on some decisions and major events), Beijing, Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1994, pp. 231-254.
40. At the national conference, Mao spoke of two anti-Party cliques led respectively by Gao
Gang and Rao Shushi. He specifically named Yang Fan as a member of the Rao clique.
At the end of the conference, he urged cadres to report to the Party, either orally or in
writing, their mistakes linked to the Gao-Rao affair and their undisclosed past mistakes.
Pan was in the Shanghai delegation at the conference and thus felt obliged to explain
the past event. On Mao’s remarks, see Mao Zedong, “Speeches at the National Confer-
ence of the Communist Party of China” (March 1955), in Selected Works of Mao Tse-
tung, vol. 5, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, First Edition, 1977, pp. 154-171.
41. Pan’s name is given in the Latin letters in the original text.
42. Yang Shangkun riji, vol. 1, 4 April 1955, p. 182.
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destine Communist network. The intelligence sector
faced great pressure as criticisms swirled within the Party.
Disarray reigned as cadres from the ministries of public
security, supervision, and state security met for a national
conference. Zhou Enlai sought to reassure them while re-
ferring to the Pan Hannian affair: “What are you afraid
of? It was I who knew Pan the longest and our relations
were the strongest. If I don’t worry about it myself, why
do you?” (43) That said, Zhou quickly put together an in-
vestigation team led by general Li Kenong, who was then
one of the seniormost officials in charge of civil and mil-
itary intelligence. The investigators reviewed the corre-
spondence between Pan and the central leadership from
March 1939 to August 1948. At the end of three months,
Li Kenong signed a detailed report on 29 July 1955 ad-
dressed to the Politburo and the Central Committee sec-
retariat. He showed that all of Pan’s activities were in
line with central directives, and that he had regularly re-
ported to central leaders, be it in respect of contacts with
Japanese secret services or the use of double agents of
the collaborationist regime such as Li Shiqun, Hu Junhe,
and others. Li Kenong also stressed the decisive charac-
ter of intelligence provided by Pan in some of the Party’s
decisions. He said there had never been a leak of organ-
isational secrets until Shanghai’s liberation, and that
some of Pan’s links continued to feed the intelligence
services at the time of the investigation. He concluded by
recommending prudent handling of the Pan affair. His re-
port was sent to the leadership mentioned above but
evoked no response despite three successive re-
minders. (44)
Zhou Enlai was not alone in doubting the fairness of
Mao’s decision. Another Politburo member, Zhang Wen-
tian, who had known Pan extremely well, told his wife that
Pan’s indictment lacked all proof and that the Politburo
had never discussed it. (45) As for Chen Yun and Liao
Chengzhi, two veterans and former comrades of Pan, they
were among the first, after Mao left the scene, to demand
his rehabilitation despite intra-Party opposition. (46)
Mao’s unshaking resolve led to the total destruction of Pan
Hannian and his wife, Dong Hui. In Shanghai alone, the
Pan affair led to action against a thousand people, of
whom 800 were arrested and condemned to jail terms;
some 200 others suffered unfair treatment, which had im-
plications for their families and descendants. Most of
them were Communist cadres and agents who were part
of Pan’s intelligence team, KMT turncoats, contacts
forged through united front work, friends, and relatives. (47)
Conclus ion:  Mao and the  man-agement of  intra-Party matters
Over the following years, Mao publicly mentioned Pan
Hannian several times. Thus at the October 1955 Sixth
Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress, he referred to Pan
as a counter-revolutionary who had evaded the Yan’an
zhengfeng (campaign to rectify the Party’s working style in
1942-1943). Less than a year later, in his major speech
“On the Ten Major Relationships,” he said of the “counter-
revolutionaries” Hu Feng, Pan Hannian, and Rao Shushi:
“We don’t have them executed, not because their crimes
don’t deserve capital punishment but because such execu-
tions would yield no advantage.” He repeated this on 30
January 1962 at the Conference of 7,000 (qiqianren
dahui), saying, with extraordinary levity, that Pan had gone
over to the Kuomintang and had been an agent of the Cen-
tral Club faction. (48) The aim of the meeting he was address-
ing was to take stock of the catastrophic Great Leap For-
ward (1958-1961).
A question that arises is why Mao was so intent on con-
demning Pan, who had never taken part in the Gao-Rao
manipulation and had never acted against the Communist
cause or Party unity. (49) Mao’s real aim might have been to
use the Rao-Pan-Yang affair to arouse within the Party a
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43. Luo Qingchang, “Pan Hannian yuan’an de lishi jiaoxun,” in Pan Hannian zai Shanghai,
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Party Congress, 4-11 October 1955), in Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long live Mao Ze-
dong Thought), vol. 3 (No page numbers), 1967, 1969; “On the Ten Major Relationships”
(25 April 1956), in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, vol. 5, op. cit., p. 323; “Zai kuoda de
zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (Speeches at the expanded meeting of the
Central Committee – 30 January 1962), in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao’s
manuscripts, 1949 to 1976), vol. 10 (Electronic version, no page numbers). 
49. Many hypotheses have been put forward. Some Chinese authors say Mao could not for-
give Pan for his deceit concerning his meeting with Wang Jingwei. Others point to the
prevailing Leftist ideology and simplistic view of Communist cadres in the complex con-
ditions of clandestine work, and their ignorance of complicated relations in the work of
united front and intelligence. Some question the possible role of Kang Sheng, the re-
doubtable head of China’s KGB in the 1940s and during the Cultural Revolution. He had
been sidelined during the 1950s. Could Pan’s elimination have weakened Zhou Enlai, as
some scholars suggest? This does not seem plausible, especially as Mao had other
means of achieving it, as we have seen earlier.
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more acute sense of class struggle and a more constant fear
of infiltration by hidden enemies. 
The Pan Hannian affair came at the start of the campaign
to eradicate counter-revolutionaries in the state apparatus
(neibu sufan). (50) During the previous campaign to rectify
the Party’s workstyle at Yan’an in 1942-1943, thousands of
Communist activists and cadres suspected of being infiltra-
tors suffered the worst persecution. This “internal” terror
had the specific aim of “upholding the basic principles and
disciplinary rules of the Party.” This was Mao’s explicit mes-
sage in speaking of the lessons from the Rao Shushi-Pan
Hannian affair.
As per Leninist dogma, the Communist Party is the instru-
ment of revolutionary leaders to capture power and realise
their transformation projects. In order to preserve combat
readiness, the troops need to be purified through regular rec-
tification tests, combating revisionist ideas, and unmasking
hidden enemies. For this, the sacrifice of some individuals
would be a striking lesson to guide the Party and the masses.
During the bloody campaign to eradicate counter-revolution-
aries in 1951-1952, Mao had already stressed this educa-
tional dimension by speaking of imparting to the population
a living lesson and powerfully buttressing the new regime’s
political authority. (51)
Mao had greatly appreciated Pan’s talent and success. But
the Party no longer needed his services as much, now that
it had cornered the near totality of resources in the political
arena. On the other hand, the Pan Hannian affair would
help Mao intimidate and bring to heel senior Party leaders.
Yang Shangkun recalled that on hearing Mao’s harsh words
against Pan on 5 April 1955, “The atmosphere in the audi-
torium suddenly grew tense. Central Committee members,
including myself, never expected it. We were all surprised;
we never thought the Gao-Rao affair could come to this.” (52)
Yang noted, “Several comrades in the Party secretariat [shu-
jichu] and Central Committee members spoke, voicing their
support for the Chairman’s directive to draw the whole
Party’s attention to the issue.” (53)
Is there a link between the Pan Hannian affair and the
power struggles of the 1950s? Evidently, in Mao’s eyes,
Right opportunism was being manifested not only in the or-
ganisational domain but also in the Party’s overall comport-
ment. It should be borne in mind that the Gao-Rao manip-
ulations started out by sowing discord between Mao and
other top leaders. Mao readily drew a parallel between his
concrete policy orientation and his revolutionary discourse
on class struggle. (54) With such juxtaposition, he could build
up an all round dominant position – on the policy line, or-
ganisation, and theory. Despite the great prestige he enjoyed
in the Party and the country, there seemed to be a certain
vague competition between Liu Shaoqi and himself. Times
had changed: China was no longer at war, and Mao had to
more often than not measure up to his colleagues in socio-
economic and technical competence, and no longer just in
military strategy. •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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50. Luo Qingchang, “Pan Hannian yuan’an de lishi jiaoxun,” op. cit., p. 364. 
51. Yang Kuisong, “Mao Zedong yu ‘zhenya fangeming’ yundong” (Mao Zedong and the
“campaign to root out counter-revolutionaries”), in Chen Yungfa (ed.), Liang’an fentu:
Lengzhan chuqi de zhengjing fazhan (Differing voices: political and economic develop-
ments on the two sides of the Strait at the start of the Cold War), Zhongyang yanjiuyuan
jindaishi yanjiusuo, Taipei, 2006, pp. 31-76, at p. 41. According to official figures, be-
tween 1951 and 1952, the campaign led to the arrest of 2.62 million people, 712,000
of whom were executed and more than a million sent to labour camps.
52. Yang Shangkun, “Huiyi Gao-Rao shijian” (Memories of the Gao-Rao Affair), in Dang de
wenxian, op. cit., 2001, no. 2, p. 21.
53. Yang Shangkun riji, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 182.
54. See Huang Jing’s excellent study, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, op. cit.
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Glossary
Babaoshan 八寶山
Baihua yundong 白話運動
Bo Gu 博古
Bo Yibo 薄一波
Chen Jitang 陳濟棠
Chen Yi 陳毅
Chen Yun 陳雲
Cheng Fangwu 成仿吾
Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石
Chongqing 重慶
Chuangzaoshe 創造社
Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平
Deng Zihui 鄧子恢
Dong Hui 董慧
Ershi shiji 二十世紀
Fangeming 反革命
Feng Xuefeng 馮雪峰
Fuzhou 福州
Gao Gang 高崗
Gonggu xinminzhu zhuyi zhixu 鞏固新民主主義秩序
Guilin 桂林
Guo Moruo 郭沫若
Hu Junhe 胡均鶴
Huainan 淮南
Jiuwang ribao 救亡日報
Juntong 軍統
Kang Sheng 康生
Kong Xiangxi 孔祥熙
Kuomintang 國民黨
Laogai 勞改
Li Du 李杜
Li Kenong 李克農
Li Shiqun 李士群
Liao Chengzhi 廖承志
Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇
Lu Xun 魯迅
Luo Ruiqing 羅瑞卿
Mao Zedong 毛澤東
Neibu sufan 內部肅反
Neijian 內奸
Ningyou wuzuo 寧右勿左
Pan Hannian 潘漢年
Pan xitong 潘系統
Qingxiang 清鄉
Qiqianren dahui 七千人大會
Quebao siyou caichan 確保私有財產
Rao Shushi 饒淑石
Ruijin 瑞金
Shaanbei 陝北
Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館
Shujichu 書記處
Sida ziyou 四大自由
Taihu 太湖
Taiyangshe 太陽社
Tan Zhenlin 譚震林
Teke 特科
Tewu 特務
Wang Jingwei 汪精衛
Xi Zhongxun 習仲勛
Xia Yan 夏衍
Xiao guangbo 小廣播
Yan’an 延安
Yang Fan 楊帆
Yang Shangkun 楊尚崑
Yin Qi 尹騏
Yixing 宜興
Yu Dafu 郁達夫
Yuan Shu 袁殊
Yuan’an 冤案
Zhang Wentian 張聞天
Zhao Xian 趙先
Zhengfeng 整風
Zhonghua shuju 中華書局
Zhou Enlai 周恩來
Zhou Fohai 周佛海
